Article: Houthi forces said on Aug. 5 they hit two Saudi tankers – Wafa in the northern Red Sea near Yanbu and Daisy in the Gulf of Aden – marking the eighth and ninth Saudi vessels struck since the rebels began a maritime blockade a month earlier. The attacks push a key oil-shipping corridor closer to the brink and force buyers such as India to reassess both price risk and naval posture.

A new front in the Red Sea

The Houthi military spokesman announced the strikes as a shift from southern routes to the northern Red Sea. Riyadh’s effort to reroute crude away from the Strait of Hormuz toward Yanbu has, in the rebels’ view, opened a fresh set of “access points” they now intend to close. Their claim of “successful” hits on Wafa and Daisy follows a string of similar incidents, each one expanding the list of vessels the group says it has damaged.

Iran continues to restrict traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia’s historic oil exit. With Hormuz under pressure, the kingdom has leaned heavily on the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the narrow choke point linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and ultimately Europe. Kpler’s shipping tracker shows crude moving through Bab al-Mandeb surged eightfold between March and mid-July 2026 compared with the same period a year earlier. Volumes rose from about 7 million barrels in February to nearly 100 million barrels in June, turning the strait into a lifeline for Saudi exports.

Why the chokepoint matters

Bab al-Mandeb is a global conduit. A disruption reverberates through world oil markets, lifts freight rates and forces shippers onto longer, costlier routes around the Cape of Good Hope. When non-state actors such as the Houthis fire ballistic missiles at moving vessels, the predictability that underpins commercial shipping evaporates. Insurance underwriters already flag the area as high-risk; any escalation can push premiums higher, adding a hidden cost to every barrel that passes the strait.

The Houthis say their goal is to “close all access points.” By targeting the northern Red Sea, they aim to force Saudi tankers into a tighter corridor where they are easier to detect and attack. If the pattern holds, rerouting or delaying shipments could become dramatically more expensive, pressuring global oil prices and the economies that depend on cheap energy.

What it means for India

  • Energy-security exposure – India imports a large share of its crude from the Middle East. A prolonged interruption or a spike in insurance costs on the Red Sea route would raise import bills and could feed inflation. Downstream refiners would have to scramble for alternative supplies or accept tighter margins.
  • Naval workload – The Indian Navy already patrols the Arabian Sea to safeguard merchant vessels. More missile threats will force a rethink of patrol patterns, rules of engagement and possibly the deployment of additional assets such as maritime patrol aircraft or surface combatants equipped for anti-missile defence.
  • Strategic balancing act – New Delhi’s ties with Riyadh rest on energy trade, while its relationship with Tehran remains pragmatic, especially on regional security. Iranian and Houthi pressure points squeeze India: it must appear supportive of “freedom of navigation” without alienating either partner.

Counter-point: Saudi mitigation and limits to the threat

Saudi Arabia is not standing still. The kingdom has begun diversifying export routes, using western Mediterranean ports and, where feasible, overland pipelines to the Red Sea. The Houthis have yet to prove they can sustain a campaign that consistently disables tankers; their claims of “successful” strikes lack independent verification, and no vessel has been reported sunk or irreparably damaged in these latest incidents.

International naval forces, primarily from NATO members, have increased patrols in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the blockade began. Their presence could deter further missile launches or at least provide rapid response to any vessel in distress. If the cost of attacking ships outweighs the strategic gain, the Houthis may recalibrate their tactics.

What to watch next

  • Frecuencia de las afirmaciones – Un flujo constante de declaraciones de los hutíes sobre ataques exitosos indicaría un ritmo operativo que podría abrumar las patrullas navales existentes.
  • Respuesta comercial – Las empresas de transporte marítimo podrían comenzar a presentar reclamaciones de seguros más altas o desviar las cargas hacia rutas alternativas, un movimiento que se reflejaría en los índices de tarifas de flete.
  • Señales diplomáticas – Las declaraciones de Riad, Teherán y el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la India en las próximas semanas darán pistas sobre si se aproxima un impulso diplomático coordinado para la desescalada.
  • Despliegues navales – Cualquier aumento visible en la actividad de buques de guerra indios o aliados en el Mar Rojo señalará un cambio del monitoreo pasivo a la disuasión activa.

La importancia del Mar Rojo como conducto para el crudo saudí es ahora innegable, y las últimas afirmaciones de los hutíes sobre Wafa y Daisy centran la atención en una región donde un puñado de misiles puede provocar repercusiones en los mercados energéticos mundiales. Para la India, el doble desafío de mantener el flujo de petróleo y mantener su armada preparada definirá la próxima fase de su estrategia marítima. La evolución de este cálculo pondrá a prueba si la presión diplomática, la presencia naval o una combinación de ambas pueden mantener abierto el punto de estrangulamiento.